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Abstract
We evaluate the folk wisdom that algorithms trained on data produced by biased human
decision-makers necessarily reflect this bias. We consider a setting where training labels are
only generated if a biased decision-maker takes a particular action, and so bias arises due to
selection into the training data. In our baseline model, the more biased the decision-maker
is toward a group, the more the algorithm favors that group. We refer to this phenomenon
as algorithmic affirmative action. We then clarify the conditions that give rise to algorithmic
affirmative action. Whether a prediction algorithm reverses or inherits bias depends critically
on how the decision-maker affects the training data as well as the label used in training. We
illustrate our main theoretical results in a simulation study applied to the New York City Stop,
Question and Frisk dataset.
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1 Introduction
Algorithms have the promise to improve upon human decision-making in a variety of settings,
but concerns abound that algorithms may produce decision rules that are biased against particular
groups. A particular fear is that if the training data is generated by a process that is biased against
a group, then the algorithm will reflect this bias. This concern is captured by the common refrain
“bias in, bias out” (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Mayson, 2018).
In this paper, we evaluate the folk wisdom that algorithms trained on data produced by biased
human decision-makers will necessarily inherit bias. Through the lens of a classic model of dis-
crimination in economics, we illustrate that algorithms trained over biased data do not necessarily
inherit bias. In fact, for a common class of prediction exercises, we show that the opposite is true:
The more biased the decision-maker is toward a group in the training data, the more favorable the
algorithm is toward that group. We refer to this phenomenon as algorithmic affirmative action. We
clarify the conditions that give rise to algorithmic affirmative action and discuss how alternative
biases in the training data affect resulting algorithms.
We consider a baseline model with three elements that together produce algorithmic affirma-
tive action. First, we consider a setting in which labels in the training data are created only if a
decision-maker chooses to take a particular action. This is commonly known as the selective la-
bels problem (Lakkaraju et al., 2017; Kleinberg et al., 2018). For instance, we may only obtain data
on whether a pedestrian is carrying contraband if a police officer chooses to search the pedes-
trian.1 Second, we follow a classic literature in the economics of discrimination and assume that
the decision-maker is a taste-based discriminator against the disadvantaged group (Becker, 1957;
Altonji and Blank, 1999; Knowles et al., 2001; Anwar and Fang, 2006; Arnold et al., 2018). This
means that the decision-maker acts as if they receive a different payoff (or face a different cost) for
taking the action of interest against a particular group. This may arise due to preferences, costs, or
misperceptions. As a result, bias in our model manifests itself through selection into the training
data. Finally, we assume that the decision-maker has access to unobservables, which are features
that are informative about the label of interest but are unavailable in the observed training data.
Each of these three elements – selective labels, taste-based discrimination and unobservables – are
critical to algorithmic affirmative action.
In this baseline model, we then show that the more biased the decision-maker is toward the dis-
advantaged group, the more favorable the resulting algorithm is toward the disadvantaged group.
To illustrate the intuition for this result, consider the example of police searches from earlier. Sup-
pose that police assess the probability that an individual is carrying contraband, and search peo-
ple with high assessed probabilities. Police base their search decision on a number of factors that
1Likewise, a college may only obtain data on a student’s performance in college if an admissions officer chooses to
accept the student or a bank may only obtain data on a borrower’s creditworthiness if a loan officer chooses to grant
the borrower a loan.
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are recorded in the data (the time of stop, location, demographics of the individual), as well as
subjective information that is not recorded in the data (their evaluation of the individual’s behav-
ior). Because police choose to search individuals with risky behavior that is unobservable to the
data scientist, an algorithm trained to predict whether contraband was found using a sample of
conducted searches will tend to make predictions that are too high for the general population.
However, this selection issue will be mitigated for African Americans if police officers are racially
biased. Indeed, in the extreme case where police officers are so biased that they search all African
Americans, regardless of underlying risk, then there will be no selection on unobservable behav-
ior for African Americans in the training data. Thus, the more biased are police officers, the more
favorable is the training data for African Americans, and hence the more the algorithm learns to
favor African Americans.
Our results do not imply that biased data can never produce biased algorithms – rather, whether
an algorithm does or does not inherit bias depends crucially on the form of the bias and the train-
ing of the algorithm. To illustrate this, we consider modifications to our baseline model that can
produce effects in line with the usual “bias in, bias out” intuition. First, algorithmic affirmative
action crucially depends on the fact that the algorithm is trained to predict the outcome of interest
(carrying contraband in the policing example) in the sample where the outcome is available. The
typical “bias in, bias out” result can be obtained if either i) the algorithm is instead trained to pre-
dict the human decision, or ii) the outcome of interest is assumed to be zero for those not selected
by the human decision-maker. Second, while we assume that selection into the training data is
determined by a biased decision-making process, we assume that the label of interest is measured
without bias. This rules out “label bias,” an additional source of bias in training data that is of-
ten mentioned in the literature on algorithmic fairness – see Corbett-Davies and Goel (2018) for a
discussion.
This paper relates to several recent works that study fairness and discrimination in a variety of
fields across computer science and the social sciences. First, several papers consider properties of
algorithms that are trained on selectively-labelled data. Kleinberg et al. (2018) and Lakkaraju et al.
(2017) define the selective labels problem and discuss its implications for evaluating the predic-
tive performance of algorithms. Kallus and Zhou (2018) studies how the selective labels problem
impacts fairness-adjusted predictors. De-Arteaga et al. (2018) illustrates that the selective labels
problem cannot be addressed via standard sample selection procedures and propose a new tech-
niques to deal with it. Cowgill (2019) shows that even if there are selective labels, an algorithm
trained on selectively-labelled data will not be biased provided that the human decisions are suf-
ficiently noisy. Madras et al. (2019) proposes a causal modeling approach to estimating fair pre-
diction functions in the presence of unobserved features. Finally, Kannan et al. (2018) studies the
related problem of how a fairness-minded decision-maker (e.g. college admissions officer) should
select a screening rule if the selected data from that screening decision are used downstream by a
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Bayesian decision-maker (e.g. employer).
Our work is also related to a series of legal papers that have argued that automating decisions
will magnify discrimination due to historical biases in existing training data – see Barocas and
Selbst (2016), Chander (2017), Mayson (2018). Our empirical application applies our result to
police searches to New York Stop, Question and Frisk. A large literature raises concerns about
biased training data in the context of the broader criminal justice system – see Lum and Isaac (2016)
and Selbst (2017) among many others. In contrast, our results suggest that for certain prediction
exercises, historical biases in training data can produce an automated decision rule that reverses
discrimination. Conversely, our results also imply that if an algorithm is trained on data that
is produced by a decision-maker that exhibits explicit affirmative action towards a group, the
algorithm could, in fact, inherit bias.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our baseline model.
Section 3 states and proves the main results. Section 4 illustrates our results in simulations based
on New York Stop, Question and Frisk data. We place more involved proofs in the Appendix.
2 A Model of Biased Decisions
In this section, we develop a model wherein the training data given to a predictive algorithm is
generated by a biased decision-making process. For the sake of exposition, we discuss the model
in the context of police bias in pedestrian searches and refer to the decision-maker as the police
throughout. This will more clearly connect our theoretical results with our empirical application
to New York Stop, Question and Frisk. However, this model is broadly applicable to other settings
with selective labels such as college admissions, loan decisions and bail decisions, among many
others.
Police officers wish to search individuals that have a high probability of carrying contraband.
Following Becker (1957) and a large literature in economics, police officers are taste-based discrim-
inators against African Americans.2 Based on the search decisions of police officers, data are then
revealed to the data scientist. If a police officer searches an individual, the data scientist observes
the result of that search (was the individual carrying contraband?), some characteristics of the
individual and the stop (age, gender, location of stop, time of stop, etc.) as well the race of the in-
dividual. The data scientist then uses this training data to construct an algorithm to predict which
individuals are most likely to carry contraband. We focus our attention on analyzing properties of
the predictive algorithm produced by the data scientist.
2Unlike Anwar and Fang (2006) and Knowles et al. (2001), we do not assume that the individual’s decision to carry
contraband responds to police search decisions. As a result, we do not introduce an equilibrium concept such as Nash
equilibrium.
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2.1 The population
Individuals in the population are characterized by the random vector (X,U,R, Y ). Let X ∈ X
denote some set of characteristics about the individual that are typically recorded after a police
search such as age, gender, location of stop, time of stop, etc. Let U ∈ U denote characteristics of
an individual that are observed by a police officer prior to a search but are typically not recorded.
For example, this may consist of the police officer’s evaluation of the individual’s behavior prior
to the stop or the individual’s behavior during the stop. Importantly, U is observed by the police
officer but is unobserved to the data scientist. Finally, R ∈ {0, 1} denotes the race of the individual
with R = 1 for African Americans, and Y ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether the individual is carrying
contraband. The population is then described by the joint distribution P of the random vector
(Y,X,R,U).
2.2 Police decisions
The police observe the characteristics (X,U,R) of each individual and decide whether to search
that individual. The police officer receives a positive payoff b > 0 if they find contraband after
searching an individual and without loss of generality, we normalize this payoff to one, b = 1. The
police officer incurs a cost c > 0 for every search. The police officer receives a payoff of zero if the
individual is not searched.
In addition, the police are taste-based discriminators against African Americans and receive
an additional payoff τ > 0 from searching African Americans. The parameter τ parametrizes the
degree to which the police are biased against African Americans. The larger the magnitude of τ ,
the more biased the police are against African Americans. So the police’s payoffs from conducting
a search are Y +τR−c. In order to maximize their expected payoff, the police will decide whether
to search according to a threshold rule:
S∗(X,U,R) = 1 (E[Y |X,U,R] ≥ c− τ ·R) .
Notice that the bias of the police implies that a lower threshold for search is applied to African
Americans. In this sense, the police are biased against African Americans.
2.3 The prediction problem
The data scientist then observes data consisting of individuals that are stopped by the police.
There are “selective labels” – the data scientist only observes whether an individual was carrying
contraband (Y ) if the police searched the individual (S∗ = 1). The data-scientist thus observes the
pair (Y,X,R, S∗) for those with S∗ = 1. In some of our results, we will also consider what happens
if the data scientist is able to observe (X,R, S∗) but not Y for those who are not searched by the
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police. Let Pˆτ denote the joint distribution of the data that is revealed to the data scientist. We
index the probability distribution of the observed data by the police’s discrimination parameter τ
as our results will focus on comparative statics over τ .
Using the observed data, the data scientist constructs a predictive algorithm of whether an
individual is carrying contraband Y using the observed features (X,R). In our baseline model,
we suppose that the data scientist trains the algorithm using only the data where the outcome is
available (S∗ = 1). For simplicity, we abstract from the estimation problem and simply consider
properties of the optimal predictor under squared loss, EPˆτ [Y |X,R, S∗ = 1], where EPˆτ [·] denotes
the conditional expectation over the distribution of observed data.
3 Main results
Since the police incorporate the unobservable U into their search decision, the training data of
conducted searches will tend to be composed of individuals that have values of U associated with
higher probability of Y = 1. As a result, the predictive algorithm trained on the selected training
data will tend to over-predict the label Y for the whole population.
However, as the police officers become more biased, this selection problem becomes less se-
vere for African Americans. Intuitively, the more biased are the police officers against African
Americans, the more likely they are to search any given African American, and so there is less
selection on the unobservable U . In the extreme case where τ ≥ c, police officers search all African
Americans, and there is no selection on the unobservable U for African Americans. The predictive
algorithm thus becomes more favorable to African Americans as the police officers become more
biased. We state this result formally.
Theorem 1. EPˆτ [Y |X = x,R = 1, S∗ = 1] is weakly decreasing in τ for all x ∈ X and τ such that
Pˆτ (S
∗ = 1 |X = x,R = 1) > 0. Likewise, EPˆτ [Y |X = x,R = 0, S∗ = 1] is constant in τ for all x ∈ X
and τ such that Pˆτ (S∗ = 1 |X = x,R = 0) > 0.
Proof. Define µX,R,U := E[Y |X,R,U ] and µX,R := E[Y |X,R]. Let U∗ = µX,R,U − µX,R, so that
µX,R,U = µX,R+U
∗.Note that S∗ = 1 if and only if U∗ ≥ T (X,R, τ) for the threshold T (X,R, τ) =
(c− τ ·R)− µX,R. Applying the law of iterated expectations,
E [Y |X = x,R = r, S∗ = 1] = E [Y |X = x,R = r, U∗ ≥ T (x, r, τ)]
= E [E [Y |X = x,R = r, U∗] |X = x,R = r, U∗ ≥ T (x, r, τ)]
= µx,r + E [U∗|X = x,R = r, U∗ ≥ T (x, r, τ)] .
Note that for r = 1, T (x, r, τ) is weakly decreasing in τ . It follows immediately that E[U∗|X =
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x,R = r, U∗ ≥ T (x, r, τ)] is weakly decreasing in τ , which gives the first desired result. Likewise,
when r = 0, T (x, r, τ) does not depend on τ , which gives the second result.
Theorem 1 shows that as the police become more biased against African Americans, the predic-
tions of the algorithm trained on the selected data become more favorable to African Americans.
Similarly, an automated search rule that decides whether to search an individual using the pre-
dictive algorithm will display similar behavior – the more biased the police are against African
Americans, the fewer African Americans will be searched by the automated search rule.
Corollary 1. Consider the automated search rule:
Sautomated(x, r) = 1
(
EPˆτ [Y |X = x,R = r, S∗ = 1] ≥ c
)
.
The fraction of African Americans searched under Sautomated (i.e, E[Sautomated(X,R) |R = 1]) is decreas-
ing in τ , whereas the fraction of whites searched under Sautomated is constant in τ .
These results clarify the manner in which the bias of police officers influences the algorithmic
treatment of African Americans. Surprisingly, the bias of police officers works in favor of African
Americans. We note that this result describes how the algorithm’s treatment of African Ameri-
cans changes as the bias of the police changes. We do not take a stance directly on whether the
algorithm’s treatment of African Americans for any given τ is “fair” in a formal sense.3 How-
ever, any sensible notion of fairness would suggest that if a given algorithm is unfair to African
Americans, then any algorithm that is “harsher” to African Americans (i.e. more likely to search
any given African American) and treats whites the same is at least as unfair. Therefore, Theorem
1 and Corollary 1 suggest that if an algorithm is unfair to African Americans when trained upon
data produced by police officers that discriminate against African Americans at some rate (τ > 0),
then an algorithm trained upon data produced by police officers that are unbiased against African
Americans (τ = 0) would be even more unfair to African Americans. Hence, the taste-based dis-
crimination of the police officers cannot be the fundamental source of unfairness in this setting.
It is important to note that while we presented these results in the context of police searches,
they apply to any setting in which there is a selective labels problem, the decision-maker that
produces the selective labels is a taste-based discriminator against a particular group, and the
discriminator has access to unobservables. When these conditions hold, the more biased is the
decision-maker, the more favorable is the algorithm to the group that is discriminated against. We
refer to this phenomenon as “algorithmic affirmative action.”
Finally, these results made no assumptions about the underlying population distribution of
(Y,X,R,U). These results apply even if there are differences across groups in the population.
For example, even if the conditional distributions of the features X differ across groups or the
3Results in Kleinberg et al. (2016) highlight that an algorithm cannot simultaneously satisfy several common defini-
tions of fairness if the base rates of risk differ across groups.
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conditional distribution of the label Y given the features X differs across groups, these results still
hold. We now analyze the extent to which algorithmic affirmative action holds under a variety of
different modifications to our baseline model.
3.1 Alternative labels
In Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we assumed that the data scientist constructs an algorithm to pre-
dict the observed label Y using the training data for the searched sample (S∗ = 1). We now
consider what happens if a different label and sample is used. First, the data scientist may instead
predict the human decision S∗ itself over the full population. This is a common type of prediction
problem in some contexts. For example, a series of papers note that using the human decision
as the label is common in training algorithms to automate hiring decisions (Cowgill, 2018, 2019;
Raghavan et al., 2019). For this prediction exercise, algorithmic affirmative action no longer holds.
Instead, the comparative static in bias now goes in the usual “bias in, bias out” direction.
Theorem 2. E [S∗|X = x,R = 1] is weakly increasing in τ for all x ∈ X .
Proof. By the law of iterated expectations, E[S∗|X = x,R = 1] = E[E[S∗ |X = x, U,R = 1]]. Then,
E[S∗|X = x,R = 1] =
∫
u∈U
E[S∗|X = x, U = u,R = 1] dF (u)
=
∫
{u∈U :S∗(x,u,1)=1}
dF (u)
=
∫
{u∈U :E[Y |X=x,U=u,R=1]≥c−τ}
dF (u).
It follows that for τ1 < τ2,
E[S∗|X = x,R = 1, τ = τ2]− E[S∗|X = x,R = 1, τ = τ1] =∫
u∈U12
dF (u),
for U12 = {u ∈ U : c−τ2 ≤ E[Y |X = x, U = u,R = 1] ≤ c−τ1}, which gives the desired result.
A second alternative prediction exercise that the data scientist may also consider is to predict
the outcome that the individual was searched by the police and that the individual was carrying
contraband. That is, construct an algorithm to predict the label Y · S∗ over the full sample. Put
otherwise, the data scientist imputes the missing label Y to be zero if S∗ = 0. This type of predic-
tion exercise is common in certain medical applications (see, e.g. Mullainathan and Obermeyer
(2017)). We again find that “bias in, bias out” holds for this prediction exercise.
Theorem 3. E [Y S∗|X = x,R = 1] is weakly increasing in τ for all x ∈ X .
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Proof. By the law of iterated expectations, E[Y S∗|X = x,R = 1] = E[E[Y S∗|X = x, U,R = 1]].
Then,
E[Y S∗|X = x,R = 1] =
∫
u∈U
E[Y S∗|X = x, U = u,R = 1] dF (u)
=
∫
{u∈U :S∗(x,u,1)=1}
E[Y |X = x, U = u,R = 1] dF (u)
=
∫
{u∈U :E[Y |X=x,U=u,R=1]≥c−τ}
E[Y |X = x, U = u,R = 1] dF (u).
It follows that for τ1 < τ2,
E[Y S∗|X = x,R = 1, τ = τ2]− E[Y S∗|X = x,R = 1, τ = τ1] =∫
u∈U12
E[Y |X = x, U = u,R = 1] dF (u)
for U12 = {u ∈ U : c − τ2 ≤ E[Y |X = x, U = u,R = 1] ≤ c − τ2}. Since the support of Y
is weakly positive, the final integral in the previous display is weakly positive, which gives the
desired result.
The key distinction between these alternative prediction exercises and our earlier result is that
bias now drives a wedge between the true outcome of interest and the label that the algorithm
is trained on (S∗ or Y · S∗). In the original setting that predicts Y over the selected sample with
S∗ = 1, the bias affects the prediction exercise only through sample composition. This is a crucial
yet subtle difference.
Taken together, these results show that the choice of label (Y vs. S∗ vs. Y · S∗) plays a key role
in determining whether human biases propagate into algorithmic predictions and automated de-
cisions, formalizing an argument made heuristically in Kleinberg et al. (2018). Table 1 summarizes
our results across the three prediction exercises considered.
Table 1: Summary of prediction exercises
Outcome Training sample Comparative static
Y S∗ = 1 Bias reversal
S∗ Full sample Bias inheritance
Y · S∗ Full sample Bias inheritance
3.2 Noisy decision-making
We next show that the results of the previous two sections are robust to allowing for random noise
in the officer’s decisions. So far, we assumed that the police officers are able to correctly combine
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the available information to construct accurate predictions about risk, E[Y |X,R,U ] and thereby
rank order individuals correctly. Extensive work in the social sciences suggest that this does not
hold in many applications of interest. For example, Kleinberg et al. (2018) suggest that even expe-
rienced judges are unable to accurately predict recidivism in bail decisions. In the following result,
we show that the comparative static in Theorem 1 still holds if police officers have independent
random noise in their risk assessments.
Proposition 1. Suppose police search according to
Snoise(X,U,R, ) = 1
(
E[Y |X,U,R] +  ≥ c− τ ·R
)
,
for a random decision shock , where  has strictly increasing hazard and is independent of X,U,R. Then,
EPˆτ [Y |X = x,R = 1, Snoise = 1] is weakly decreasing in τ for all x ∈ X and τ such that Pˆτ (Snoise =
1 |X = x,R = r) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
Similarly, the comparative statics derived for the alternative prediction exercises are also robust to
noisy decision-making.
Proposition 2. The conclusions of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 hold replacing S∗ with Snoise.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
3.3 Excluding group membership from the predictive algorithm
Next, we consider what happens if the data scientist is forbidden from using group status in the
predictive algorithm. For example, it may be illegal for a predictive algorithm to explicitly use race
as a feature (Kleinberg et al., 2018; Gillis and Spiess, 2019). In this case, the prediction function in
the baseline model now takes the form EPˆτ [Y |X,S∗ = 1].
Whether the comparative static in bias still holds now depends on whether group status R
is “reconstructable” from the observed features X . That is, it depends on whether group status
is predictable from the observed features. If group status is perfectly reconstructable, then these
results trivially hold for a prediction function that does not use group status as EPτ [Y |X,S∗ =
1] = EPˆτ [Y |X,R, S∗ = 1].
If group status is not perfectly reconstructable, then one can construct examples in which the
gap in average predictions across groups for a group-blind algorithm moves in the opposite di-
rection as the gap in average predictions across groups for an algorithm that includes race. The
direction of the effect will depend on whether the marginally searched individual in the R = 1
group is more “similar” to the average person with R = 0 or R = 1. As a simple example to
illustrate this, suppose there is only one observed, binary feature X . Suppose that among whites,
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X = 1 with probability 1 −  for some small  > 0. Among African Americans, X = 0 with
probability 1 − . Then, if the marginally searched African American has feature X = 1, then an
increase in the bias of police officers will have a larger effect on the average prediction for whites
than African Americans, as there are relatively more whites among the group with X = 1 in the
observed data. Conversely, if the marginally searched African American has feature X = 0, then
it will have a larger effect on the average prediction for African Americans than whites. The same
intuition holds for the alternative prediction exercises that we considered earlier.
The reconstruction problem has been discussed at length elsewhere – see, among many others,
Kleinberg et al. (2018); Lipton et al. (2018); Chen et al. (2019); Datta et al. (2017). Typically, the
reconstruction problem is treated as a source of bias in algorithms. Our results illustrate that this
is not true generally. If group status is reconstructable, then an algorithm that is blind to group
status may reverse bias and implement algorithmic affirmative action.
4 Application: New York City Stop, Question and Frisk
We now apply these results to the New York Stop, Question and Frisk (SQF) data. We syntheti-
cally create a training data set that is produced by biased search decisions and illustrate the key
comparative static described in Section 3.
4.1 Data description
SQF was a program in New York City that allowed the police to temporarily stop, question, and
search individuals on the street. We use publicly available, stop-level data that contains informa-
tion on all stops conducted as part of the SQF program from 2008-2013, totalling over 4 million
stops of pedestrians and over 350,000 searches (Goel et al., 2016).
For each recorded stop, we observe whether the stopped individual was searched for contra-
band and if so, an indicator for whether contraband was found. The data also contains several
detailed characteristics of the stopped individual and the circumstances of the stop. The features
in the data include the stopped individual’s age, gender, and build, and the time and location of
the stop. We treat these as the observable features X . Importantly, we also observe the race R of
the stopped individual. For simplicity, we restrict attention to stops of non-Hispanic whites and
African Americans.
The data also records the officer’s stated reason for conducting the stop – for example, the
officer can select that the stop was conducted because the pedestrian was "carrying a suspicious
object" or "displayed behavior indicative of a drug transaction." We treat these responses as the
unobservable features U that are available to the officer at the time of the search decision but are
unavailable to the data scientist. This is analogous to “soft information” about the individual that
may be available to the officer at the time of the stop but may be unavailable in certain data sets.
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4.2 Simulation design
We conduct a simulation exercise that trains an algorithm to predict whether a stopped individual
is carrying contraband on synthetic training datasets that are generated from the original SQF
data. Across synthetic training datasets, we vary the degree of bias against African Americans in
search decisions by selectively “undoing” observed searches. We then examine how changing the
degree of bias against African Americans affects the resulting algorithm’s predictions.
More concretely, we first subset the data to only include stops in which searches were con-
ducted (S∗ = 1). We then randomly split the searched SQF stops into two partitions. In the
first partition, we construct a predictor for carrying contraband among stops with searches. The
predictor estimates E[Y |X,R,U, S∗ = 1], where X is a feature vector that includes demographic
information about the stopped individual such as age, gender and build as well as the location
and time of the stop, and U is the officer’s stated reason for the stop. We construct the predictor
using logistic regression, matching the approach of previous research using this data (Goel et al.,
2016; Kallus and Zhou, 2018).
In the held-out partition, we then use the estimated prediction function to construct a synthetic
search flag Sˆ. For individuals with Yˆ = Eˆ[Y |X,R,U, S∗ = 1] ≤ cR, we set Sˆ = 0 and treat them
as if they had not been searched. For individuals with Yˆ > cR for R ∈ {0, 1}, we set Sˆ = 1. This
produces a synthetic dataset at the search thresholds (c0, c1) in which we observe (Y,X,R, Sˆ) for
each observation. Finally, we re-estimate the prediction function over the synthetically searched
observations. We estimate the functions E[Y |X,R, Sˆ = 1], E[Sˆ|X,Y ] and E[Y Sˆ|X,R] using logistic
regression and examine properties of the estimated prediction functions.
We repeat this simulation for a variety of different thresholds c0, c1 to construct a series of
synthetically searched observations at different levels of bias against African Americans. We vary
c0, c1 so that 50 percent of the synthetic dataset is always searched and only the composition of
searches between African Americans and whites vary. We vary the fraction of searches that are
conducted on African Americans from 80 percent to 95 percent.
4.3 Simulation results
Figure 1 plots the results from our simulation exercise. The X-axis plots the discrimination param-
eter τ = c1 − c0 across synthetic datasets. As discussed earlier, larger values of τ correspond to
more bias against African Americans relative to whites and so, larger values on the X-axis repre-
sent a more biased search rule. The Y-axis plots the fraction of African Americans that fall in the
top 50 percent of predicted risk using the prediction function estimated over the synthetic dataset.
The predictions from our earlier results in Section 3 hold sharply. First, as the police become
more biased against African Americans, the prediction function Eˆ[Y |X,R, Sˆ = 1] becomes more
favorable to them. In particular, fewer African Americans fall in the top half of predicted risk as
τ increases. This illustrates our result of algorithmic affirmative action in a concrete application
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of interest. Second, as the police become more biased against African Americans, the prediction
functions Eˆ[Sˆ|X,R] and Eˆ[Y Sˆ|X,R] become less favorable to African Americans. As τ increases,
more African Americans fall in the top half of predicted risk. Once again, for these prediction
functions, “bias in” implies “bias out.”
Figure 1: NYC SQF Simulation Results
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluated the folk wisdom that algorithms trained on data that are produced by
biased human decision-makers will necessarily inherit bias. We showed that in an important class
of prediction exercises, the opposite holds: The more biased the decision-maker towards a group,
the more favorable is the algorithm towards that group. We called this phenomenon “algorithmic
affirmative action.” We then showed that the form of the bias and the label used in training are
important determinants of whether one obtains algorithmic affirmative action or “bias in, bias
out.”
These results suggest that when we consider whether algorithms will inherit human biases,
it is important to think carefully about the form of the human bias, how it affects the training
sample, as well as how the labels and features are selected for the algorithm. Additionally, while
some of the literature on fairness in algorithms has focused on blinding algorithms from group
membership, our results also suggest that there are cases in which it may be beneficial for the
algorithm to be group aware. This is in line with results found by Dwork et al. (2012); Kleinberg
et al. (2018); Gillis and Spiess (2019).
Our analysis abstracted away from a number of potentially important considerations. First,
we assumed that the outcome Y is measured without bias. This is often a significant concern
in many empirical settings of interest. Second, our results in Section 3 focused on properties of
the optimal, population prediction function EPˆτ [·] under squared loss and abstracted away from
12
finite-sample considerations. Although our simulation evidence indicates that our results still
hold in finite-sample, this deserves further attention. Similarly, extending these results to more
general loss functions may be of interest. Finally, we focused attention on a taste-based model
for discrimination. Other models of discriminating behavior may yield different conclusions. For
example, discrimination may arise due to stereotypes (e.g. Bordalo et al. (2016)) or differential
noise in the decision-maker’s predictions across groups (e.g. Li (2017)).
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A Proofs of Additional Results
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proposition 3.1 follows immediately from the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose the police search individuals according to
Snoise(X,U,R, ) = 1
(
E[Y |X,U,R] +  ≥ c− τ ·R
)
,
for a random decision shock, . Suppose that the distribution of  ⊥ U |X,R and has an increasing hazard.
That is, f(|X,R,U) = f(|X,R) and f(|X,R)1−F (|X,R) increasing in . Then, µX,R,U |{S = 1, X,R = 1} has
the monotone likelihood ratio property in −τ , where µX,R,U = E[Y |X,U,R] as before.
Proof. The police choose Snoise = 1 if and only if µX,R,U +  ≥ c− τ ·R, or equivalently, if and only
if  > c− τ ·R− µX,R,U . Consider µ1 < µ2. Then,
P
(
µX,R,U = µ1|Snoise = 1, X,R
)
P (µX,R,U = µ2|Snoise = 1, X,R)
=
P
(
Snoise = 1|µX,R,U = µ1, X,R
)
P (Snoise = 1|µX,R,U = µ2, X,R)×
P (µX,R,U = µ1|X,R) /P
(
Snoise = 1|X,R)
P (µX,R,U = µ2|X,R) /P (Snoise = 1|X,R)
=
P ( > c− τ ·R− µ1|X,R) · P (µX,R,U = µ1|X,R)
P ( > c− τ ·R− µ2|X,R) · P (µX,R,U = µ2|X,R)
=
(
1− F|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ1]
) · P (µX,R,U = µ1|X,R)(
1− F|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ2]
) · P (µX,R,U = µ2|X,R)
where the first equality follows from Bayes’ Rule and the second and third apply definitions. Now,
differentiating with respect to −τ :
∂
∂(−τ)
(
P
(
µX,R,U = µ1|Snoise = 1, X,R
)
P (µX,R,U = µ2|Snoise = 1, X,R)
)
=
R ·
(
f|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ1]
(
1− F|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ2]
)(
1− F|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ2]
)2 −
f|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ2]
(
1− F|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ1]
)(
1− F|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ2]
)2
)
× P (µX,R,U = µ1|X,R)
P (µX,R,U = µ2|X,R) ,
Clearly, this derivative is zero if R = 0. If R = 1, the derivative is greater than or equal to zero if
and only if
f|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ1]
(
1− F|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ2]
)
− f|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ2]
(
1− F|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ1]
) ≥ 0
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or equivalently,
f|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ1]
1− F|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ1]
≥ f|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ2]
1− F|X,R [c− τ ·R− µ2]
. (1)
However, since µ1 < µ2, we have c − τ · R − µ1 > c − τ · R − µ2, and so (1) holds if |X,R has
increasing hazard.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The modified claim for Theorem 2 follows from the proof of Theorem 2, replacing expectations
over U with expectations over the joint distribution of (U, ). Similarly the modified claim for
Theorem 3 follows from the proof of Theorem 3, replacing expectations over U with expectations
over the joint distribution of (U, ). 
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